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To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
The answer of W. J. Ripley to the petition filed by Jeru~ 
shia Callis, praying that the judgment of the Circuit Court 
of Mathews County, entered on the 3rd day of December, 
1931, in a certain suit in chancery in the Circuit Court of 
Mathews County, wherein the said W. J. Ripley was the 
complainant, may be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
The cardinal rule for the construction of wills is first 
to ascertain the intent of the particular testator and if 
his purpose be legal to give it effect. W·ith this rule in mind 
we submit that the testator in the instant case intended: 
First, to give a life estate in his real estate to his wife, 
Nancy W. Ripley; second, a life estate to his son, W. 0. 
Ripley; third, a fee-simple estate to the children of W. 0. 
Ripley, should he die leaving lawful issue of his body; 
fourth, -and should he die without leaving children, the said 
real estate should be equally divided among his nearest sur-
viving heirs, meaning his·nearest kin living at the death of 
the life tenant. 
This intention is obvious from a careful reading of the 
will as a whole and especially the second and third para-
graphs, the third paragraph of which reads as follows: 
"That is to say I desire to loan unto my son, W. 
0. Ripley, the home where I at present reside on 
trust during his natural life, and should he die leav-
ing no laWful issue of his body, then said land ·and 
improvement shall be equally divided with my next 
surviving heirs." 
Ill' the answer of J erushia Callis filed in the lower court, 
counsel takes the position that the words "and should he 
die leaving no lawful issue of his. body" mean nothing be-
cause the sentence was not completed, i. e., it did not state 
who was to get the estate if he died with lawful issue of 
his body. 
And on page 3, paragraph 4 of the petition, counsel says: 
"There is an expression in the will which might 
[ 3 ] 
lead to confusion if W. 0. Ripley had children. In 
the second paragraph after giving him a life estate 
subject to the life estate of his mother, it says 
'should he die leaving no issue of his body, then said 
land and improvements shall be equally divided with 
my next surviving heirs', but as he never had anY 
children this language does not present any trouble 
in this case." 
We submit that this language has a meaning and is im-
portant in arriving at the true intention of the testator, 
William R. Ripley. For should he, W. 0. Ripley, the life 
tenant, die leaving lawful issue of his body, said issue would 
take the estate in fee-simple by implication.. This conten-
tion was upheld in the Virginia case of Garber v. Saufly, 
et al, reported in 109 S. E., page 306, 131 Va. 514. Judge 
Saunders in delivering the opinion of the court quoted with 
approval Wine v. Markwood, 31 Gratten (72 Va. 48). 
In the Garber caBe the court said: 
" 'I give to E. Orvetta Garber the balance of my 
property, etc., her life time, and if she should die 
without any heirs' by plain implication confers upon 
the heirs of Orvetta Garber, i. e., the descendants 
living at the time of her death the life estate devised 
to the mother. Such descendants are tenants in re-
mainder of the life estate of the ancestor." 
In the instant case there is nothing in the will that refers 
to the death of the testator as the time the vesting of the 
estate is intended. On the contrary the plain intention of 
the testator is that the estate should vest at the death of 
the life tenant, W. 0. Ripley, in his children, should he leave 
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any, and if none, then in the next surviving heirs of the 
testator, William R. Ripley. 
Counsel recognizes the doctrine that the law favors the 
early vesting of estates, but this being a gift to a class, 
to-wit: "imy next surviving heirs", the oourts have had little 
difficulty in construing gifts to a class when language simi-
lar to the language in the instant case is used. In the case 
of DriskeU, et al v. Carwille, et als, reported in 145 Va. 116, 
133 S. E., page 773, which was instituted to construe and 
interpret the will of P. J. Stern, the paragraph of said will 
which was necessary to construe reads as follows: 
~'The said property I give unto N annie P. Moon 
during her life and that of her husband, Nathan S. 
Moon, and at their decease I direct the same to be 
sold and equally divided between the living heirs of 
my brothers and sisters." 
In construing this paragraph of the will Judge Prentis 
says: 
"Being a gift to a class it is necessary to deter-
mine the time when the membership in that class is 
to be ascertained. Here, too, we have little diffi-
culty because of the precedents. The general rule 
is that the time for fixing the membership in a class 
taking under a will is the death of the testator, but 
where the distribution (italics ours) is to be made 
among a class at a time subsequent to the testator's 
decease then only those who belong to the class when 
such time arrives are entitled to share in the distri-
bution." Citing 128 R. C. L., page 264. Colling v. 
Colling, 1 Barb. Ch. N.Y. 630. Gilliam v. Guaranty 
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Trust Company, 186 N. Y. 127; Thompson v. Gar-
wood, 3 Whar. Pa. 287; Coggins Appeal, 124 P~. 10. 
Judge Prentis in this case cited with approval 40 Cyc. 
1447 as follows: 
"Where under the provisions of a will a gift to a 
class is postponed either to a particular time or pend-
ing the termination of a preceding estate as a rule 
those members of a class and those only, take who· 
are in existence at the arrival of the time of distri-
bution, as at the death of the life tenant (italics 
ours) unless the particular language used confines 
the gift to those in existence at the testator's death 
or who were in existence at the date of the Will." 
And in this same case Judge Prentis quotes with approval 
2 Jarman on Wills, 6th edition Bigelow, 675-1547 as fol-
lows: 
"In this state of the authorities· one scarcely needs 
hestitate to affirm that the rule which reads a gift to 
survivors simply as applying to the objects living 
at the death -of the testator is confined to those cases 
in which there is no other period to which survivor-
ship can be referred, and that where a gift is pre-
ceded by a life or other prior interest, it takes effect 
in favor of those who survive the period of distri-
bution and those only." 
An in this case Judge Prentis quotes with approval the 
ease of C011eny v. McLaughlin, 148 Mass.: 
"The question is whether the word 'surviving' re-
lates to the time of the testator's death or to that of 
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his wife's death. According to the natural use of 
language it has reference to the latter event. It is 
placed in close connection with her decease. No 
:reference is made to the time of his own death in 
any part of the will. The word 'surviving' would 
be unnecessary and meaningless if he meant to give 
the remainder of the estate to all of his children." 
We find further support for this position in Page on 
Wills, 2nd Edition, Volume 2, as follows: 
"If the only provision for a gift is found in the 
direction that property should be divided at the 
death of the life tenant among the heirs of the tes-
tator,. such provision tends to show that 'heirs' 
means heirs as of the death of the life tenant." 
Page 1551 citing DeWolf v. Middleton, 18 R. I. 110. 
"A gift to one for life and then over to the sur-
vivors of a class means those who survive when the · 
life estate termi~tes." Page 1560 citing Way v. 
Gevise, 280 Ill. 152 ; Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mis-
souri 496.; Dutton v. Pugh,. 45 N.J. Eq. 426,; Sinton 
v .. Boyd,. 19 0 .. S. 30. 
"Under a gift to the members surviving when the 
property is to be divided on the youngest member 
reaching the age of eighteen, the class is fixed when 
the youngest member reaches such age." Page 1561 
citing M erowitz v. Whitby, 138 Md. 222. 
"Where a particular estate is devised by will with 
the remainder to- the -living children or to the issue · 
then liv.ing the class is to be determined not as of 
the testator's death but as it existed at the expira-
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tion of the particular estate." Page 1544, citing 
Wood v. Bullard, 151 Mass. 324. 
This principle is also upheld in the West Virginia case 
of Shaeffer's Administrator v. Shaeffer's Administrator, 46 
S. E., page 150, Syllabus by the court as follows: 
Will-Construction-Survivorship-Nature of Estate. 
1. Does survivorship in a will relate to the death of the 
tenant for life or other point of time? 
2. A will gives to testator's widow a life estate with 
power to sell some realty and consume its proceeds and then 
says "At the death of my wife what real estate and personal 
property may be left shall be sold and divided equally among 
my children or their children or their representatives." 
"Testator's children took no absolute or vested 
estate during the life tenancy, and such estate could 
vest ollly in those living at its close, and a deed of 
trust for debt given by a child dying before the life 
tenant has no effect upon testator's property against 
children of such child." 
In the North Carolina case of Jessup, et al v. Nixon, et al,. 
137 S. E. 810, 2nd Syllabus Wills-
"When gift to survivors is preceded by an estate 
for life or years words of survivorship usually refer 
to termination of particular estate. Generally words 
of survivorship in wills refer to death of testator as 
time when survivorship will be determined unless it 
appears that testator intended to refer to a time 
after his death, but when a gift to survivors is pre-
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ceded by particular estate for life or years ·(italics 
ours) words of survivorship in the absence of any-
thing indicating a contrary intention usually refer 
to the termination of the particular estate." 
And in the South. Carolina case of Rountree v. Rountree, 
et al, 2 S. E. 27 4, the court held as follows: 
"Where a testator gives property to his widow for 
life with remainder to ·be equally divided among his 
surviving children the death of the life tenant and 
not that of the testator or the date of the will is the 
period which much be looked to in order to deter-
mine who are to take." 
"A remainder to the testator's surviving children 
upon the death of the widow who is given a life 
estate is a contingent remainder; only those who 
are alive at that time taking; and it being wholly 
uncertain untU that event occurred who the persons 
entitled to this would be." 
In the Virginia case of Simmons, et als v. Gunn, et als, 
157 S. E. 573, 155 Va. -, Judge Prentis said in Syllabus 7: 
"Codicil providing for life estate in trust for de-
mented child of testator residue to revert to other 
children of testator, held to reduce absolute estate 
given in will to such child to life estate with remain-
der over to testator's children living at life tenant's 
death." 
:Section 5151 ·of the Code of Virginia provides as follows: 
"What limitations are vaUd.-Every limitation in 
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any deed or will contingent upon the dying of any 
person without heirs, or heirs of the body, or issue, 
or issue of the body, or children, or offspring, or 
descendant, or other relative, shall be construed a 
limitation to take effect when such person shall die 
not having such heir or issue or child or offspring 
or descendant, or other relative, as the case may be, 
living at the time of his death, or born to hiinl' with-
in ten months thereafter unless the intention of 
such limitation be otherwise plainly declared on the 
face of the deed or will creating it." 
In the instant case the testator devised to his next sur-
viving heirs the real estate mentioned in the will should 
the life tenant, William 0. Ripley, die, leaving no lawful 
issue of his body. It is perfectly plain that the instant case 
comes within the purview of Section 5151 of the Code, and 
if there was no other authority to sustain the position taken 
by appellee in this case, counsel is of the opinion that this 
section of the Code would settle the matter in favor of the 
appellee, as the section provides that every limitation in a 
deed or will contingent upon the dying of any person with-
out heirs, etc., shall be construed a limitation to take effect 
when such person shall die not having such heir or issue, 
etc., which is the provision in the wirll in the instant case. 
We contend that the word "then" as used in the third 
paragraph of the will in the instant case is an adverb of 
time, referring to the death of the life tenant as the time 
for the vesting of the estate in the surviving heirs of the 
testator and the division thereof among them. 
In the Georgia case of Roberts, et als v. Wadley, et al, 118 
S. E., page 664, the court said: 
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"In the will construed in the Gibson case the word 
'then' was employed by the testator in referring to 
the contingency of death of one or both of the devi-
sees and in the decision rendered by the trial judge 
(which was quoted in full and approved in the opin-
ion handed down by this court) great stress was 
laid on the word 'then' as being an adverb of time 
and denoting an intention on the part of the testa-
tor to make the reversion referred to effective ac-
cording to whether or not at the death of one of the 
devisees, whenever occurring, child or children 
should then be left by such devisee, and in the case 
of Curles v. Wade, 151 Georgia 142, the testator de-
vised land to his son, directing that the salme belong 
and the title vest in my son immediately after my 
death ; but if he should d-ie without a child or chil-
dren then in that case the above described property 
be divided equally among my nieces and nephews; 
the court held that the language 'then i'n that case' 
referred to the death of the children and not to that 
of the testator." 
And in the case of Nottingham v. McKelvy, 149 Ga. 463, 
the testator gave to his nephews certain land. By a codicil 
executed the sa-me day the will was executed he added this 
provision: 
"I will and desire that if my two nephews to 
whom he had given the land. should die without heirs 
of their body then all of my property, that is willed 
and given to them go and be the property of other 
named persons." 
"Here the words of survivorship clearly indicated 
--- ·~-~ ~ -~------
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they referred to the death of these legatees and that 
if they died without heirs of their -body, then the 
. estate was to go to other named persons. The use· 
of the word 'then' clearly indicated that the testator 
meant that the fee vested hi his nephews would be 
divested when they died without heirs." 
In the instant case the testator in paragraph 5 of his will 
gave to his other four sons $2.00 each which shows his 
intention was to exclude them from any further rights or 
interests in his estate except that he required his son, Wil-
liam 0. Ripley, the life tenant, to pay unto his son, James R. 
Ripley, the sum of $40.00 without interest, said amount to 
be paid either before or after the death of his wife, Nancy 
W. Ripley, which is further proof of the fact of his inten-
tion to exclude them from any other interest in his estate 
unless they should survive the life tenant, William 0. Rip-
ley, he dying without lawful issue of his body. 
It could hardly be argued that the testator intended his 
other four sons to take the estate after the death of the life 
tenant, he. dying without issue because the life tenant was 
the youngest of his five sons, ·being nine years younger than 
the one next to him. It being in the nature of things safe 
to assume that the others would predecease the life tenant 
which as a matter of fact has actually happened, the last 
brother having died about ten years ago. 
Nor does it seem probable that the testator at the time 
of the drafting of his will, which was done only some 
twenty-one days prior to his death, when he states his de-
slre that the remainder should be divided equally with his 
next surviving heirs should the life tenant die without law-
ful issue of his body was contemplating the vesting of his 
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estate in his other four sons when the life tenant, W. 0. 
Ripley was at that time a boy but twelve years of age, un-
married, and had he been married, was not of the age to 
become the father of children according to the generally 
'conceived knowledge of the age of puberty. 
The case of Cottrell v. Mathews, et al, 120 Va. 847, and 
the case of Lantz v. Massie, 99 Va. 709, cited by the peti-
tioner in support of her position, are not in point, because 
the remainder in these cases was so limited as to have a 
present capacity of taking effect in possession in person in 
being ·and capable of being ascertained immediately upon 
the particular estate, that is, the beneficiaries were desig-
nated and capable of being ascertained at the death of the 
testator, whereas, in the instant case there were two life 
estates with a clear intention on the part of the testator 
to give an estate in fee to the issue, if any, of the second 
life tenant, but if none, to divide the property equally among 
his, the testator's, surviving heirs at the death of the second 
life tenant. 
The case of Allison v. Allison, 101 Va. 527, was also cited 
by the petitioner in support of her posi·tion. It will be 
readily seen by a careful reading of the will construed in 
this case that no words of limitation are used in the will to 
designate the period the heirs are to be ascertained, the 
testator stating that the remainder be divided among "my 
heirs at law" according to the laws of the State of Vir-
ginia. 
However, as stated above, there were no words used in· 
the will which showed an intention on the part of the tes-
tator that the remainder should vest at the expiration of 
the life estate or other limited estate. Yet Judge Cardwell 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he said: 
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"As an original proposition, I would never give 
my consent to the application of the rule of construc-
tion to the will in this case which requires that the 
words 'my heirs at law according to the laws of the 
State of Virginia' as used by the testator, Jaimes W. 
Allison, deceased, in disposing of the ultimate re-
mainder in the residuum of his estate, are to be 
taken as referring to his heirs, etc., to be ascer-
tained as of the period of his own death, and not at 
the death of his daughter, Mrs. Moore, who is to 
enjoy the whole of this residuum during her life. 
·The application of this purely technical rule of 
construction has doubtless worked a hardship in 
many cases, overturning the apparent intent of the 
testator and I have the gravest apprehension that 
this is the result in this instance." 
In the instant case the word "then" and the words "next 
surviving heirs" clearly indicate the intention of the tes-
tator that the remainder should vest at the death of the 
life tenant without issue, and not at the time of his own 
death, which shows that the Allison case is not in point 
with the instant case. 
Our position is that no part of the estate of William R. 
Ripley vested in E. T. Ripley, the father of Jerushia Callis, 
the petitioner in this case, during his lifetime. Hence, he 
had no estate in said property to devise to his daughter, 
J erushia Callis; that the only interest she would have in 
the estate of William R. Ripley would be her interest as one 
of the surviving heirs of William R. Ripley, her grand-
father, should she survive the life tenant, William 0. Ripley, 
he dying without issue. 
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In conclusion, we submit for the reasons given above 
and the authorities quoted, that the trial court's construc-
tion of the last will and testament of W-illiam R. Ripley was 
a proper and legal construction of the said will and that 
the decree of the said court should be affirmed. 
W. J. RIPLE.Y, 
By GILBERT L. DIGGS, 
V. R. TRUITT, 
Counsel. 
